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Why the Federal Marriage Amendment 
is Necessary 
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE* 
The U.S. Senate last year rejected the Federal Marriage Amendment 
(FMA), the object of which is to confine marriage throughout the United 
States to one man and one woman.1  In light of the results of this past 
year’s national and state elections, it is likely that this issue will continue 
to be pressed in the U.S. Congress in the near future—though its success 
is doubtful, given the enormous obstacles to such an undertaking. 
The amendment issue has been forced on the country by gay rights 
advocates and activist lawyers and judges unhappy with their inability to 
achieve their objectives through the democratic process.  Many of those 
opposed to gay marriage would have been just as happy not to go the 
amendment route.2  There are serious reasons, however, to think that it is 
just as well that the battle over the amendment has been joined. 
 *  Professor, Department of Political Science, Marquette University. 
 1. Carl Hulse, Senators Block Initiative to Ban Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2004, at A1.  The proposed amendment, S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004), reads: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a 
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be 
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred 
upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.
 2. See Joshua L. Weinstein, Senators Balk on Gay-Marriage Amendment; Snowe 
and Collins Signal They Will Join the Majority in Defeating the Proposal, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, July 13, 2004, at A1 (citing Republican Senator Snow, “I believe that 
marriage should be defined as a marriage between man and woman, but I don’t think that 
a constitutional amendment is necessary.”); see also John DiStaso, Sununu Stance Stirs 
Conservatives, THE UNION LEADER, Aug. 16, 2004, at A1 (“Sununu opposed President 
George W. Bush and most of his GOP Senate colleagues in voting against the Federal 
Marriage Amendment last month.  He said states, not the federal government, should 
decide whether to recognize same-sex marriages.”). 




In this article I will argue in favor of a Federal Marriage Amendment.  
In the first section, I will examine the broader context of this battle, 
which suggests that the FMA offers us an opportunity to “shore up” the 
original design of the Constitution, in the face of two profound assaults 
on it.  In the second section, I will respond to an article that criticizes the 
FMA and suggests, instead, an amendment that would protect state 
power to set policy on this issue.  In the third section, I will briefly set 
out why marriage is an issue of such importance as to merit a 
constitutional amendment. 
I.  CHANGES IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE CONSTITUTION:                  
TWO PROBLEMS 
Two kinds of fundamental constitutional change have occurred in the 
twentieth century, though without adherence to the formal mechanisms 
of change, and without securing democratic approval.  In both cases, the 
changes were illegitimate—imposed on the nation by courts and the 
elites such courts represent.  These changes should be reversed and the 
original constitutional design reestablished. 
A.  Illegitimate and Relatively Unchecked Judicial Power 
The first change involves judicial power in the United States.  The 
American Constitution was framed by men who distrusted unchecked 
power, and the Constitution is replete with checks and balances.  
However, they are imposed especially on the legislative power (naturally 
the strongest power in a republic, the Founders thought) and the executive 
power (a power inherently broad and difficult to define, especially in its 
exercise of “the power of the sword”).  The Founders paid less attention 
to checks on the judiciary, which was, after all, incomparably the branch 
“least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution . . . .”3  
Hamilton even mocked fear about judicial power as a “phantom,” in 
Federalist No. 81, because of all the inherent limits on judicial power.4
The Founders could view judicial power this way because they could 
take for granted that Americans shared the idea that judicial power was 
quite limited.  There were differences regarding the scope of that power.  
Most, but not all, of the Founders, for example, accepted the relatively 
novel notion of judicial review, the power of courts to strike down 
 3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 
1892). 
 4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 598 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 
1892). 
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unconstitutional laws.5  Nevertheless, even those who accepted judicial 
review understood it as a very exceptional power limited to rare 
circumstances, when a constitutional violation was manifest or clear.6
Moreover, in the ordinary exercise of common law judicial power, 
where it might be said that judges sometimes exercised a more 
discretionary power, such exercises occurred in the absence of law, not 
in cases overriding it. 
Since the founding, however, judicial review has been transformed, 
from an essentially interpretive power to a legislative power.  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. played the central role in bringing about a 
transformed understanding of judicial power, beginning with The 
Common Law (1881), and his intellectual progeny completed the 
application of the new view in stages following the constitutional 
revolution of 1937.7  Today, people from both ends of the political 
spectrum recognize the enormous power the judiciary wields, though 
they often disagree normatively about the propriety of such power, 
depending on the case.8
The argument for this transformation was the need for a more 
effective check on the ordinary democratic process, in order to protect 
the democratic values of liberty and equality.9  The paradigm case was 
the judicial intervention that served as a catalyst to achieve racial 
equality, in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education.  Only by 
transforming judicial review into something much more than simply 
effectuating the provisions of the Constitution could judges achieve the 
Constitution’s “sparkling vision of the supremacy of the human dignity 
of every individual.”10
This transformation was based on a trust in judges that would be 
touching, were it not so self-serving.  The constant denigration of the 
political branches—fostered by the increasing political cynicism of the 
 5. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM 254 (1985). 
 6. On the Founders and judicial review, see CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF 
MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–120 (rev. ed. 1994). 
 7. See id. at 121–322. 
 8. For an argument that judicial power is excessive from the right, see ROBERT 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) and for an argument on the left, see MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 9. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR 
PRECARIOUS SECURITY? 47–68 (rev. ed. 1996). 
 10. William Brennan, Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown 
University (Oct. 12, 1985) reprinted in THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y, THE GREAT DEBATE: 
INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 18 (1986). 




late twentieth century—was an excuse to exalt judicial power, with 
judicial critics being characterized simply as those whose oxen were 
being gored.11  The problem with this new power was magnified by the 
dearth of effective checks on the judiciary in the Constitution, based on 
the original, much more limited understanding of judicial power.  Had 
the Framers thought that judges were to exercise the power they 
routinely exercise today, they would have been appalled at the thought 
of leaving them so unchecked. 
There are some checks on the judiciary, of course.  Impeachment is 
pretty much dead, except in cases of outright corruption, as a means to 
check the judiciary.12  However, the appointment power remains and 
can sometimes be used to reverse the Court, as in the response to the 
laissez-faire Court in the 1930s, or at least rein it in, as in response to 
the Warren Court in the 1960s.  Furthermore, in extreme cases, constitutional 
amendments can override judicial decisions. 
Nevertheless, the obstacles to the exercise of these powers is 
enormous.  Today, when intense minorities that support Supreme 
Court decisions are willing to use the filibuster against Supreme 
Court appointments, Court legislating can be slowed down, but not 
reversed.  The Court majorities that have given us Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey and Lawrence v. Texas, reaffirming abortion rights and creating 
gay rights, would not have been majorities without members appointed 
by Republican presidents clearly opposed to such decisions. 13
11.    [There is] a growing trend to label decisions upholding or expanding 
civil rights as the product of judicial activism, with the pejorative implication 
that such decisions represent an attempt by judges to improperly disregard 
legal precedent or to thwart . . . “the will of the people.” Conversely, decisions 
that are consistent with a more politically conservative outlook are typically 
portrayed as products of judicial restraint.  
   It seems to me, however, that the term ‘judicial activism’ ultimately 
depends upon whose ox is being gored, and not upon judicial, political, or 
social persuasion. . . . 
  . . . 
  . . . The persistent campaign against judicial activism inevitably contributes 
to the politicalization of the judiciary, especially at the federal level, which can 
only serve to undermine the overall independence of the judiciary and, in turn, 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of our courts as an institution. . . . 
Thelton Henderson, Social Change, Judicial Activism, and the Public Interest Lawyer, 12 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 39, 41 (2003).  Judge Henderson is a District Court Judge for the Northern 
District of California. 
 12. See Luke Bierman, Judicial Independence: Beyond Merit Selection, 29 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 851 (2002) (noting the rarity of judicial impeachments within the 
last 200 years). 
 13. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003).  Justices O’Connor and Kennedy (appointed by Reagan) and Justice 
Souter (appointed by George H.W. Bush) have been particularly important figures in 
these decisions. 
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The constitutional amendment process, like other legislative checks on 
the judiciary, ironically, reverses the practical effect of checks and 
balances.  The Framers originally intended checks to prevent the 
imposition of policies that lacked broad public support.14  The burdens 
of inertia were on those who wanted to change the status quo.  Today, 
the checks in Congress, and from federalism, operate to prevent checks 
from being effectively employed to limit a judiciary that is free to 
impose policies lacking sufficient support to be legislated.15
B.  The Judicial Expansion of Sexual Autonomy 
The second change concerns one important substantive component of 
contemporary judicial activism, namely, its jurisprudence on “social 
issues.”16  The modern judicial juggernaut has touched on many areas, 
but one area of particular emphasis—often across partisan affiliations—has 
been the sexual revolution.  The Court hopped on that particular bandwagon 
in the 1960s, with its decisions legalizing pornography and especially its 
Griswold decision, which created a right to privacy in sexual matters, at 
least for married couples (a decision hardly necessary, even on the views 
of its supporters, given the trajectory of social mores that guaranteed 
imminent oblivion for laws against contraception).17  That foothold 
quickly and dramatically expanded with application of the Griswold 
right to the unmarried in Eisenstadt v. Baird18 and its extension to 
abortion in Roe v. Wade.19
The Justices—likely encouraged by the great controversy occasioned 
by Roe—seemed willing to rein in judicial injunctions on behalf of 
sexual autonomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.20  In that case, the Court 
 14. This can be seen most clearly in the implications of the “extended republic” 
principle of Federalist No. 51: “In the extended republic of the United States, and among 
the great variety of interests, parties, and sects, which it embraces, a coalition of a 
majority of the whole society could seldom take place on other principles, than those of 
justice and the general good.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(John C. Hamilton ed., 1892). 
 15. CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR 
PRECARIOUS SECURITY 60–61 (rev. ed. 1997). 
 16. A more extensive discussion of this trend appears in Christopher Wolfe, Public 
Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 65 (2000). 
 17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 18. 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). 
 19. 410 U.S. 113, 169–70 (1973). 
 20. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 




refused to establish a constitutional right to homosexual sodomy.21  By 
the end of the 1980s it also seemed that the Court would likely overrule, 
or at least drastically prune, the Roe v. Wade abortion right.  However, 
the allegedly “conservative Court” of the 1990s reaffirmed broad abortion 
rights in Casey (piously endorsing a broad view of stare decisis, and 
refusing to overrule Roe), upheld the barbaric practice of partial-birth 
abortion in Stenberg v. Carhart,22 and moved on to establish a right to 
sodomy in Lawrence (this time, hypocritically giving short shrift to stare 
decisis, and overruling Bowers).23
One of the key factors that indirectly helped make this judicial 
campaign possible was the fact that it had to be carried on merely in the 
absence of anything in the Constitution to support it.  It did not have to 
contend with positive and explicit substantive obstacles in the text of the 
Constitution.  Why not? 
The Framers established a limited federal government whose primary 
responsibilities were conducting war and foreign affairs, and providing a 
framework for a national economy (especially by removing domestic 
protectionist obstacles to it).24  No one dreamed of entrusting fundamental 
social issues (such as marriage and family law, or laws regulating sexual 
morality) to the federal government, since those were firmly left in the 
hands of the states.  There was little to worry about, in any case, since 
there was little controversy about such issues at the time, due largely to 
the consensus on family and sexual morality that flowed from common 
religious beliefs of Americans (largely Protestant Christianity, at a time 
when Christians differed little on such matters). Thus, the Founders 
could more or less take for granted social mores (reflected in, and 
supported by, state laws) that would support the traditional family and 
channel sexual activity in directions that reinforced it.  There was no 
need even to think about such matters at a national constitutional 
convention. 
Of course, the Framers’ assumptions have since been blown away.  
Since the 1960s, in particular, social mores have changed substantially, 
with the aggressive support of judges committed to an agenda of relative 
sexual autonomy (and dismissive of popular doubts or opposition).25  As 
Justice Scalia famously pointed out in Romer v. Evans (1997): “When 
the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights 
 21. Id. at 190–91. 
 22. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 23. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 24. See MARTIN DIAMOND, THE FOUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 111–51 
(1981). 
 25. See Gerard Bradley, The New Constitutional Covenant, 9 THE WORLD AND I 
359 (1994), http://www.worldandi.com/specialreport/1994/March/Sa12153.htm. 
WOLFE.DOC 10/5/2005  10:30 AM 
[VOL. 42:  895, 2005] Why the Federal Amendment is Necessary 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 901 
 
rather than the villeins—and more specifically with the Templars, 
reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the 
Court’s Members are drawn.”26  These views are in opposition to “the 
more plebeian attitudes that apparently still prevail in the United States 
Congress” and in various state legislatures.27
Just as the Constitution lacked effective handles to latch on to in order 
to resist the expansion of judicial power—because the Framers could 
take a limited concept of judicial power for granted—so the Constitution 
lacks effective handles for resisting the exaltation of sexual autonomy by 
judicial invalidation of state laws intended to support the traditional 
family.  In both cases there was no warrant in the Constitution for the 
judicial pretensions, but the problem of resisting such pretensions was 
exacerbated by the absence of provisions explicitly contrary to such 
pretensions.  That absence was occasioned by the fact that there was no 
need for them when the Constitution was being written, and for a long 
time thereafter, because at the time modern forms of judicial activism 
and sexual autonomy were virtually unthinkable. 
C.  The FMA: Reinforcing the Design of the Constitution 
The Federal Marriage Amendment is highly desirable precisely because it 
is a structural response to these two problems: the general exaltation of 
judicial power, and the judicial exaltation of sexual autonomy.  It will 
place in the Constitution, not only a specific principle that resolves the 
specific issue of same-sex marriage, but a principle that can exercise a 
more general “gravitational” force. 
First, it will provide explicit constitutional grounds for rejecting 
judicial pretensions to resolve social policy, especially in the direction 
of sexual autonomy.  The background and history of the amendment 
will make it clear that the American people consider these judicial 
pretensions to be, not only unsupported by the Constitution, but directly 
opposed to it.  It will reinforce the fact that, in our form of government, 
the resolution of such issues belong to the people.28
 26. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 653. 
 28. In his response to my article, Donald A. Dripps makes an unconvincing case 
that the FMA entrusts the definition of marriage to federal judges, and imagines a string 
of unlikely possibilities.  See Donald A. Dripps, Three Tensions, and One Omission, in 
the Case for the Federal Marriage Amendment, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935, 937–39 
(2005). Of course, given the power of various forms of legal realism, it is hard to 




Second, the gravitational force of the amendment will also support a 
presumption in favor of state (and, within the limits of its powers, 
federal) legislation on behalf of marriage and other traditional sexual 
mores against judicial assaults based on the federal Constitution. State 
legislatures would remain free to alter social policy, except with regard 
to gay marriage itself, but it would be more difficult for judges to take 
advantage of the fact that the Constitution says nothing about these 
social issues in order to impose their own policy preferences. 
II.  CONSERVATIVES, FEDERALISM, AND THE FMA 
While most of the people who support the FMA are political 
conservatives, there are numerous conservatives who do not support the 
absolutely rule out any abuses of judicial power.  However, Professor Dripps’s 
suggestions are unpersuasive.  In general, they ignore the force of the word “only” in the 
amendment, which shows its clear intent to be exclusion of other forms of marriage—
homosexual marriage, polygamy—rather than shifting marriage law in general to federal 
jurisdiction.  His suggestions also ignore “the reason and spirit” of the law, 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 61, and the “objects” of the law, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), that should guide intelligent interpretation.  See WOLFE, supra 
note 9, at 17–72. 
No one can reasonably argue that the amendment’s purpose is to transfer to federal judges 
the power of defining the age of consent.  The clear purpose of the amendment—to exclude 
from marriage unions other than a union between a man and a woman—has no bearing on the 
age of consent.  States can continue to define the age of consent, and even to have different 
ages of consent.  The amendment does not reject jurisdictional pluralism on that issue.  The 
language offers no grounds for judges to overrule a state decision on that matter.  Just consult 
state law—no need to ask your local federal judge.   
Likewise, the rejection of unions other than those between a man and a woman as marriage 
does not in any way imply that all unions between a man and a woman are automatically 
legitimate (as in the case of adult incest Professor Dripps offers).  Dripps, supra note 28, at 
942.  His assertion that “the textual argument is straightforward” is unjustified and 
unjustifiable.  Id.  Limitations on some man-woman unions are neither nonexistent nor left to 
judicial interpretation.  They are left where they are, with state law. 
The same can be said of possible judicial definitions of essential constituents of a 
“union” (such as terminability, property sharing, child maintenance, possible procreation, and 
the machinations of dogged divorce litigants).  All are left where they are, with state law, 
because there is no reasonable interpretation of the amendment, in light of its known 
purposes, that would entrust such matters to federal jurisdiction.  The active imagination 
of Professor Dripps and other lawyers proves nothing. 
It is true that activist judges may deliberately misinterpret the amendment, though more 
likely by narrowing it than by expanding it.  However, even many activist judges have some 
sense of being subordinate to law and also some sense of institutional self-interest in the face 
of majorities strong enough to pass a constitutional amendment.  While no one can guarantee 
that judges will honor the intent of the FMA, it seems likely that they will.  Moreover, why 
should the FMA’s proponents just give up, on the grounds that some judges might be willing 
to violate certain fundamental principles of political morality, putting themselves above the 
law? 
This section of Professor Dripps’ paper reminds us of nothing so much as opponents of 
a law trying to impose on it a meaning directly at odds with the purpose of its 
proponents.  Id. at 937–39.  Such efforts usually are, and should be, ignored. 
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FMA.  These conservatives generally oppose the amendment on federalism 
grounds.29  Since the conservatives who support the FMA rightly value 
the constitutional principle of federalism, these arguments have to be 
taken seriously.  In the end, however, the arguments are mistaken, on 
both theoretical and practical grounds. 
A.  Yoo and Vulchev’s Conservative Case Against the FMA 
John Yoo and Anntim Vulchev lay out these arguments in The 
Conservative Case against the Federal Marriage Amendment.30  They 
maintain that the Federal Marriage Amendment is opposed to the 
principles of federalism, but, recognizing honestly that it is likely that 
legislative bars to same-sex marriage will be overridden by judges.31  
They propose a different amendment, which would simply ensure the 
right of states to determine policy in this area for themselves, without 
federal interference.32
Yoo and Vulchev argue that “a) the starting observation that the 
citizenry’s significant opposition to same-sex marriage rights is a 
manifestation of what is best termed ‘philosophical conservatism,’ leads 
to b) the conclusion that the very principles which animate opposition to 
same-sex marriage should also lead to strong doubts about the FMA.”33  
They define philosophical conservatism (following J.G.A. Pocock) as 
“the claim that human beings acting in politics always start from within 
29.    [A] federal amendment to define marriage would do nothing to 
strengthen families—just the opposite.  And it would unnecessarily undermine 
one of the core principles I have always believed the GOP stood for: 
federalism.   
  In our system of government, laws affecting family life are under the 
jurisdiction of the states, not the federal government.  This is as it should be.  
After all, Republicans have always believed that government actions that affect 
someone’s personal life, property and liberty—including, if not especially, 
marriage—should be made at the level of government closest to the people. 
Alan Simpson, Editorial, Missing the Point on Gays, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at A21.  
Simpson is a former Republican senator.   
 30. John C. Yoo & Anntim Vulchev, The Conservative Case Against the Federal 
Marriage Amendment, 2004 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: SINGLE SEX MARRIAGE art. 
3, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art3. 
 31. Their arguments on this point, id. at 1–6, form a persuasive response to 
Professor Dripps’ doubts about the likelihood of judicial imposition of gay marriage. 
 32. Yoo and Vulchev do not offer specific language, but they suggest that “[s]uch 
an amendment might be similar to the second part of DoMA, its purpose being to ensure 
each state’s right to not recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages.”  Id. at 10 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 33. Id. at 6. 




a historically determined context, and that it is morally as well as 
practically important to remember that they are not absolutely free to 
wipe away this context and reconstruct human society as they wish.”34  
This, they argue, is “the essence of the principled disapproval of the rush 
toward same-sex marriage,” and “it is this historical sensibility that 
should give marriage traditionalists pause in their current attempts to 
amend the Constitution.”35
The Framers made the constitutional amendment process difficult, “to 
be done only in response to strict necessity.”36  Amendments have, therefore, 
been few, and used mostly to modernize the workings of democracy (for 
example, expanding suffrage, direct election of Senators) and “organizing or 
limiting the powers of the federal or state governments.”37  Yoo and 
Vulchev observe that the “most notable effort to regulate purely private 
conduct—the 18th Amendment’s establishment of Prohibition—failed 
miserably and led to the rise of organized crime.”38
The Founders’ primary goal was liberty, and “federalism was the great 
guarantor of liberty.”39  “According to Tocqueville, the ‘distinguishing 
characteristics’ of the original republic were ‘decentralized order’ 
(federalism) and ‘mediating institutions,’ and the latter were reinforced 
by the former.”40  What opponents of same-sex marriage must face is 
that federalism’s survival depends on the willingness of citizens to 
defend state autonomy even against national policies they find attractive. 
Yoo and Vulchev invoke the analogies of Prohibition and Roe v. 
Wade’s nationalization of abortion policy.  Prohibition was a failure.  Not 
only was its enforcement uneven, brutal, and ineffective, but it ironically 
“ended up greatly enhancing the power of the federal government” 
through burgeoning federal agencies and broad Congressional powers 
under the Eighteenth Amendment’s enabling clause.41  Since many 
Americans believe passionately in gay marriage (and their numbers 
might increase) what will be the outlet for these passions, and how “will 
the nation cope with inevitable civil disobedience?” 42
 34. Id. at 6–7 (quoting Edmund Burke, Introduction, in REFLECTIONS ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE vii (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) 
(1789–1799)). 
 35. Id. at 7. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. Id. (quoting John McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist 
Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 507–11 (2002)). 
 41. Yoo & Vulchev, supra note 30, at 8. 
 42. Id. at 9. 
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Roe v. Wade exacerbated the deeply divisive issue of abortion.  
Abortion protests now plague national politics, instead of the 
disagreement being worked out at the state level, despite the fact that 
“more people would be satisfied with the results of state-by-state 
resolution, [and] those results would be more stable.”43  The effort to 
nationalize marriage might produce similar results, plaguing national 
politics, when allowing “gay marriage to be decided state-by-state could 
avoid the political divisiveness produced by Roe v. Wade and, in fact, 
lead to a more enduring settlement of the issue.”44
A federalism-gay-marriage amendment, on the other hand, would have 
the advantages of preserving the benefits of federalism.  States could 
“compete for residents and businesses by offering different mixes of 
economic and social policies” and citizens “can satisfy their preferences 
by deciding to live in states that provide the . . . policies with which they 
agree.”45  Moreover, the states could serve as Justice Cardozo’s “laboratories 
of democracy,” adopting different policies on gay marriage, so that it 
would be possible to test empirically the contentions  of proponents and 
opponents about its effects. 
B.  The Case Against the Conservative Case Against the FMA 
Yoo and Vulchev are right to value the principles of conservatism and 
federalism.  Unfortunately, their understanding of the proper application 
of these principles to the same-sex marriage issue is mistaken. 
1.  Conservatism 
The essence of the conservative opposition to same-sex marriage is not 
that it is a rush to a new social policy.  If the movement were slower, its end 
would be just as objectionable. The essence of conservative opposition lies 
in its rejection of the radical aim of altering the nature of the marriage, 
depriving it of its universally recognized characteristic–throughout human 
history and in all parts of the world—of gender complementarity. 
There is more substance in the idea that philosophical conservatives 
object to efforts to “wipe away historically determined context and 
“reconstruct human society as they wish.”46  However, this does not 
 43. Id. at 10 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995 (1992)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 6–7 and text accompanying note 34. 




advance Yoo and Vulchev’s case.  First, there is nothing in their article 
that suggests that opponents of same-sex marriage are attempting so 
egregious a reconstruction.  The FMA, in fact, does little more than 
reinforce a long-established status quo policy against efforts to supplant 
it with a radical new policy.  The FMA does not radically change our 
form of government—as an amendment shifting general control over 
family law to Congress would, for example—but simply resolves one 
specific issue. 
Second, Yoo and Vulchev, not their opponents, are the ones who seem 
relatively tolerant about experimenting with radical new social policies, 
even if that experimentation is at the state level.  The philosophical 
conservatism they describe, however, would be opposed to efforts by 
people to “reconstruct society as they wish” at any level of government. 
2.  Caution in Amending the Constitution 
It is true that the Framers were opposed to multiplying amendments.  
However, those who oppose the FMA do not argue, as did Thomas 
Jefferson, for frequent amendment of the Constitution.47  The only question, 
then, is whether the FMA meets the criterion of amending the Constitution 
only on matters of the utmost importance.  Its backers—rightly, I 
think—say that same-sex marriage is a profoundly important issue, and 
therefore justifies an amendment.48
Yoo and Vulchev try to narrow the criteria for appropriate 
constitutional amendments by arguing that most of the amendments to 
the Constitution have either (a) “focused on modernizing the workings 
of our democracy” and/or (it’s not clear which) (b) had “the purpose of 
either organizing or limiting powers of the federal or state governments.”49  
They point out that “the most notable effort to regulate purely private 
conduct—the 18th Amendment’s establishment of Prohibition—failed 
miserably.”50
It is clear that both “a” and “b” provide independent grounds for 
reasonable constitutional amendments (that is, one cannot say that “a” is 
a requirement for all amendments).  If constitutional amendments were 
limited to modernizing the workings of our democracy, then—as they 
apparently recognize, given their inclusion of “b”—certain amendments 
could not be explained.  The most egregious example would be the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which dealt with an issue—slavery—much 
more profound than the modernizing of government.  Of course, the 
 47. Yoo & Vulchev, supra note 30, at 7. 
 48. See infra Section III. 
 49. Yoo & Vulchev, supra note 30, at 7. 
 50. Id. 
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Thirteenth Amendment fits nicely into category “b”—organizing or 
limiting the powers of the federal or state governments.  So does the 
FMA, by prohibiting federal and state governments from doing 
something very specific: making marriage anything but a union of one 
man and one woman. 
The reference to Prohibition as an effort to regulate purely private 
conduct is revealing.  Is drinking purely private conduct?  The newly 
enfranchised women who led the fight for Prohibition did not think 
so.  The collateral effects of excessive use of alcohol—especially on 
wives  and children—was certainly one of the driving forces behind the 
amendment.51  The Eighteenth Amendment was a mistake—but not 
because it dealt with purely private conduct.  Most fundamentally, it 
failed to distinguish between the kinds of drinking that are morally 
unobjectionable, and even good, and the kinds that are excessive and 
harmful. 
More importantly, though: Is the implication here that marriage is, as 
Prohibition supposedly was, purely private conduct?  If Yoo and 
Vulchev are implying that marriage is purely private conduct, then their 
conservative case against the FMA rests on a distinctly unconservative 
view of marriage, which is a very social, very public institution. 
3.  Federalism 
The analogy of abortion, as Yoo and Vulchev suggest, is instructive, 
but in ways different from their own argument.  They maintain that we 
should want to avoid nationalizing the gay marriage issue when we see 
the effects of nationalization of abortion after Roe v. Wade, with 
abortion protests plaguing the nation, rather than policy being worked 
out at the state level.52  However, this argument is unpersuasive to those 
who also oppose the attempt to simply “refederalize” the abortion issue. 
Why do abortion protests plague national politics?  The reason is simple: 
because it is such a fundamental issue of moral principle.  Abortion is more 
like slavery than it is like seatbelt laws or minimum wage laws.  Those who 
oppose abortion in principle cannot be satisfied with working out the issue 
 51. See Eileen L. McDonagh & H. Douglas Price, Woman Suffrage in the 
Progressive Era: Patterns of Opposition and Support in Referenda Voting, 1910-1918, 
79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 415, 419 (1985) (“Temperance and prohibition were a response to 
a social problem—drunkenness and alcoholism—viewed as threatening a democratic 
conception of community and society.”). 
 52. Yoo & Vulchev, supra note 30, at 9–10. 




at the state level, any more than opponents of slavery were satisfied with 
working out that issue at the state level.  (Unlike abolitionists, opponents like 
Lincoln could tolerate temporary—even long-term, temporary— compromises, 
but they could not forego the ultimate goal of eliminating slavery 
throughout the nation.) 
As has been noted often, the federalism solution to an issue like 
slavery is a variation of the “pro-choice” argument.  Yoo and Vulchev 
are content to leave the same-sex marriage issue to the states, resulting 
in a “different mix of economic and social policies” from which 
Americans can choose.53  This parallels Stephen Douglas’ position, 
when he argued that the issue of slavery should be left up to the 
territories—that he didn’t care which way they decided.54  Similarly, 
“pro-choice” advocates say that abortion decisions should be left up to 
individuals.  However, opponents of slavery had to care whether slavery 
was prohibited in the territories—whether the national government 
would tolerate slavery, not only in the states (as the Constitution 
required) but in the territories (which the Constitution did not require), 
thus undermining its abiding commitment to the eventual elimination of 
slavery,  pursuant to the principles of the Declaration of Independence.  
Opponents of abortion, believing that abortion is the taking of innocent 
human life, also must care whether abortion is a permitted individual 
choice. 
In all three cases (slavery, abortion, marriage), the question comes 
down to this: Is the principle at issue so fundamental that it cannot be 
left optional either for individuals or for states?  The person who 
advocated strict legal or federal neutrality on slavery—opposing the 
position of Lincoln that the federal government, and ultimately all 
American government, had to recognize that slavery was incompatible 
with the nation’s founding principles—had to say that permitting slavery 
was morally tolerable (even if the justification for it were that it was 
merely a necessary evil or that the issue was too divisive to resolve 
politically).  The person who advocates legal neutrality on abortion has 
 53. Yoo & Vulchev, supra note 30, at 10. 
 54. Lincoln stated: 
Every thing that emanates from him or his coadjutors in their course of 
policy, carefully excludes the thought that there is any thing wrong in 
slavery. All their arguments, if you will consider them, will be seen to 
exclude the thought that there is any thing whatever wrong in slavery. If you 
will take the Judge’s speeches, and select the short and pointed sentences 
expressed by him—as his declaration that he “don’t care whether slavery is 
voted up or down”— you will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you 
do not admit that slavery is wrong. 
4 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 122 (Arthur Brooks Lapsley 
ed., 1906) (1858). 
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to maintain that permitting abortion is morally tolerable (even if its 
justification is merely that of being a necessary evil or that it is too 
divisive an issue to resolve politically).  The person who advocates strict 
federal neutrality on abortion—favoring a federalism amendment that 
simply returns the issue to the states, and being content with a “different 
mix” of state policies on the issue—has to maintain that abortion is 
morally tolerable.55  The person who advocates a federalism amendment 
on the gay marriage issue, which simply returns the issue to the states, 
and is content with a different mix of state policies on the issue, does not 
think that gay marriage is a fundamental issue.  However, the crux of the 
real conservative case in favor of the FMA is that gay marriage, like 
slavery and abortion, is precisely such a fundamental issue. 
The ready acceptance of a checkerboard pattern of state policies either 
does not understand, or, more likely, simply does not agree with the 
justification for defending certain essential features of marriage.  Yoo 
and Vulchev’s “conservative case against the FMA” reflects fundamental 
agreement with the advocates of gay marriage that gender complementarity 
is not essential to the maintenance of marriage as the fundamental social 
institution on which society rests.56
Moreover, the acceptance of varying state policies allows more than 
just the proverbial camel’s nose into the tent.  If a certain number of 
states authorize gay marriage, and if one considers the de facto 
nationalization of various media, then one can assume that formally 
“married” gay couples will become staples on television, in movies, and 
in books.  This normalization of gay marriage would act powerfully to 
undermine residual opposition to it, because there is a strong, though 
often inexplicit, connection between the moral ideals of citizens and 
their sense of what is normal in their society.  The most principled and 
fundamental case against gay marriage is not that it should not be 
permitted (as if it were genuinely an optional matter), but rather, that it is 
 55. I concede that the moral implications of the federalism approach to abortion 
would look different, however, if it were intended simply as a step to a more 
comprehensive solution. I think that such a strategy would still be a misplaced one, 
however, since an effort to achieve a federalism amendment would likely exhaust the 
political capital of the forces opposed to abortion and make a more comprehensive 
solution less likely rather than more likely. 
 56. That is why Yoo and Vulchev can talk about “different mixes of . . . social 
policies,” apparently not concerned that there are core features of marriage, such as 
gender complementarity, that should be preserved from experimentation. Yoo & 
Vulchev, supra note 30, at 10. 




impossible.  Any purported gay marriage lacks essential and necessary 
qualities of real marriage, irrespective of what the law says, just as a 
bigamous marriage or a marriage between a man and an animal would be 
impossible.  However, the normalization of gay marriage inevitably tends to 
promote even among the opponents of gay marriage the view that gay 
marriage should not be permitted, rather than the view that gay marriage is 
impossible.57  This is, of course, precisely one of the goals of those who 
seek to legitimize gay marriage in some jurisdictions, as a step toward 
complete legitimization of it.  The backers of the federalism-gay-marriage 
amendment ought to be forthcoming about their acceptance of this effect of 
such an amendment. 
Yoo and Vulchev appeal to some of the benefits of federalism that 
could be derived from a federal gay marriage amendment: more people 
are satisfied, national political divisiveness is avoided, and states can 
compete by offering different mixes of social policy and also can 
thereby serve as laboratories of experimentation so that we can evaluate 
claims of proponents and opponents of gay marriage.  However, these 
effects of a federalism approach are not always genuinely beneficial.  
Net popular satisfaction would arguably have been increased by Congress 
leaving polygamy to the territories, since the sum of pro-monogamy 
sentiment in all of the states except Utah, and the pro-polygamy 
sentiment of Utah would exceed the total national pro-monogamy 
sentiment.  Nevertheless, the nation rightly decided not to weigh all 
preferences equally on that issue, because it believed that the pro-polygamy 
sentiment was wrong and should not be given equal weight (any more than 
pro-slavery sentiment should be given equal weight). 
Abortion will continue to be the source of political divisions—to 
“plague” national politics—for as long as its opponents do not accept its 
legitimacy, just as slavery “plagued” national politics because its opponents 
were not willing to accept its legitimacy.  If things had settled down into 
peaceful acceptance of the status quo, the slave interest would have 
achieved its goal.  Likewise, the elimination of the “political divisiveness” 
of abortion would be a signal that the new, judicially-imposed, pro-abortion 
status quo had won.  Similarly, elimination of controversy about gay 
marriage in national politics would likely mark the victory of the 
soon-to-be-imposed judicial regime of gay marriage. 
 57. An example of this socialization effect can be found in attitudes toward 
divorce among Roman Catholic Americans.  Their church teaches, not just that divorce 
is not a good idea or that it is wrong, but rather that it is an impossibility—because the 
original marriage is still intact, and will remain so until the death of one of the spouses.  
Yet many American Catholics view the prohibition as a “rule for Catholics” imposed on 
them by church leaders, rather than as a statement about reality.  Not surprisingly, such a 
view has led to increasing acceptance of divorce by some Catholics. 
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States often do serve as laboratories of experimentation, but the 
question is whether society should be experimenting with its most 
fundamental social institution in this way.  The very principle that Yoo 
and Vulchev see as key to philosophical conservatism—its opposition to 
experiments that “wipe away” historically determined context and to 
those who would “reconstruct human society as they wish”58—grounds 
conservatives’ opposition to carrying out radical experiments with 
marriage, such as the elimination of gender complementarity (or 
monogamy). 
Moreover, it is not clear that state experimentation with marriage will 
provide us with much genuine evidence.  First, the effects of gay 
marriage most emphasized by its opponents are the less tangible and 
long-term effects on marriage as an institution, which because of their 
nature are difficult to measure.  Second, the experiment itself—the existence 
of different laws in different states—undermines the socializing effect of 
a legal system that prohibits gay marriage entirely and itself promotes 
views tolerant of diverse marriage forms.  Third, different state laws are 
likely to have comparatively little impact on the attitudes that ground 
marriage as an institution, relative to the effect of national cultural 
influences (especially the national media and entertainment and popular 
culture) and the constant interaction of citizens of various states.  
Finally, another reason to limit experimentation with important social 
institutions is that it is unclear whether certain experiments are 
reversible, irrespective of whether their effects are good or bad (a 
judgement which is likely to be subject to heated ideological controversy 
anyway).  For example, Miller v. California and Paris Adult Theatre v. 
Slaton reversed the legal basis for a judicially-compelled experiment 
with a very narrow view of what constituted obscenity, as represented by 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts and Stanley v. Georgia.59  Nonetheless, the 
 58. Yoo & Vulchev, supra note 30, at 7. 
 59. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557 (1969).  The similarity here is that these Warren Court cases were an 
experiment with more relaxed standards of obscenity, but once the genie was out of the 
bottle (that is, society had experienced a growth in obscene materials), it wasn’t possible 
to get it back in (that is, return to greater limits on obscenity).  The experiment with more 
freedom for obscene materials had expanded society’s “outer limits of tolerance,” and 
therefore even when the Burger Court restored a broader power to regulate obscenity, the 
political will to use it had been significantly undermined.  Likewise, experimentation 
with same-sex marriage will help to “normalize” it, and thereby make it more difficult to 
restore limits on it. 




damage to social mores had been done, and even after the Court restored 
greater legal authority for communities to regulate obscenity, the power  
was not widely exercised. 
4.  A Federalism Amendment and the Status Quo 
Yoo argues elsewhere that “the purpose of a constitutional amendment 
should be to restore the status quo ante that existed” prior to recent pro-gay 
marriage activism (like that of the court decision in Massachusetts and local 
officials in San Francisco).60  But what exactly is the “status quo” to be 
restored?  Is it simply the non-gay-marriage status quo before Goodridge 
v. Department. of Public Health?61  Was it the status quo before Texas v. 
Lawrence struck down state anti-sodomy laws or Romer v. Evans struck 
down a state constitutional amendment preventing gay rights ordinances?62  
Or should we try to return to the status quo before privacy decisions like 
Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut? 
Gay marriage is part of a larger movement of ersatz sexual liberation.  
Simply returning the issue to states—a deliberately purely procedural 
goal—would likely accomplish little.  The preservation of marriage requires 
something more substantial—an amendment that is, in fact, substantive, 
that takes a stand on the nature of marriage itself. 
One is tempted to wonder whether the goal of a federalism amendment 
on the same-sex marriage issue may have a sort of Kissinger-esque 
quality.  Some have contended (fairly or unfairly) that the goal of Henry 
Kissinger’s foreign policy in Vietnam, and perhaps more broadly, was to 
secure a “decent interval” between American withdrawal and a Communist 
takeover of South Vietnam.63  The goal was to put at least a little better 
face on an inevitable defeat: we could say that we had made an 
honorable effort to buttress our allies there and to give them a chance to 
win on their own.  Likewise, a federalism amendment—devoid of any 
substantive endorsement of any view of marriage, and, in fact, opposed 
in principle to any such endorsement—would likely end up providing 
little more than a decent interval before the inevitable defeat of those 
who sought to stem the tide of a new understanding of marriage (itself 
only part of a broad new understanding of sexuality and family). 
Yoo and Vulchev point out that according to Tocqueville “the 
‘distinguishing characteristics’ of the original republic were ‘decentralized 
 60. John Yoo, Editorial, Let States Decide, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2004, at A8, 
available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/03/01_yoo.shtml. 
 61. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 62. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 63. See generally JEFFREY KIMBALL, UNCOVERING THE SECRET HISTORY OF NIXON 
ERA STRATEGY (2003); FRANK SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL (1977). 
WOLFE.DOC 10/5/2005  10:30 AM 
[VOL. 42:  895, 2005] Why the Federal Amendment is Necessary 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 913 
 
order’ (federalism) and ‘mediating institutions,’ and the latter were 
reinforced by the former.”64  Therefore, “federalism was the great guarantor 
of liberty.”65
The mediating institutions to which Yoo and Vulchev refer were 
historically reinforced by the decentralized order of federalism.  However, 
that leaves out a very important fact: The mediating institutions 
included, and some of them depended on, what Tocqueville called “the 
first of [American] political institutions,” namely religion.66  Religion 
(that is, the nearly universal adherence to Christianity in early America) 
was important politically, not so much for its own sake, but because it 
promoted a necessary moral framework for society, a moral framework 
that included especially a certain view of marriage, sex, and family.  The 
states could have responsibility for social institutions, and could experiment 
with various details, because there was broad social agreement (which 
precluded experimentation) on the fundamental principles that derived 
from the dominant religious views of the time.67  Federalism is not the 
only guarantor of liberty, rather, it is simply one of the guarantors of 
liberty.  That federalism is an important end, but not an unalterable means, 
to protect liberty is seen, above all, in the movement to end slavery that 
culminated in the Thirteenth Amendment. 
In the final analysis, the conservative case against the FMA turns on 
the question of how important it is to maintain traditional marriage and 
whether a federalism amendment can achieve that goal.  Marriage is a 
social institution of such importance that preserving it easily qualifies as 
an appropriate object of constitutional protection.  Furthermore, it is very 
doubtful that a federalism amendment would do much more than slow 
down social changes in the meaning of marriage, and therefore it is an 
inadequate response to the problem.  The only adequate response is an 
amendment that will establish a substantive principle that reinforces 
marriage against the efforts of those who would change it radically. 
 64. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
 65. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 66. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 305 (Philips Bradley ed., 
Francis Bowden trans., 1999) (1835). 
 67. Note that, though these principles were derived from the dominant religious 
views of the times, they are not necessarily inherently or exclusively religious.  In fact, 
much of the Christian teaching on marriage, family, and sexuality is based on natural 
law—or at least can be defended on that basis—rather than on revelation. 




III.  WHY TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE? 
In one sense, I think it is self-evident that marriage is a profoundly 
important issue, which is deserving of society’s attention.  For a great 
part of American history there was a sufficient consensus on the general 
nature of marriage that public policy regarding the details of marriage 
could be left to the states.  While there was some variation from state to 
state, for example, with regard to the grounds of divorce and the time 
frame for accomplishing it, those differences did not lead to changes in 
the essential characteristics of marriage as a social institution.  However, 
that has changed. 
A.  Recent Developments Regarding Marriage 
In the last three decades or so, more dramatic changes have occurred, 
and they do bear upon the very nature of marriage.  These changes have 
paved the way for the even more dramatic changes implicit in the 
adoption of homosexual marriage. 
The widespread adoption of different versions of no-fault divorce by 
most states after 1970 was a profound change.  The traditional strong 
presumption of the relative permanence of marriage, except for certain 
defined reasons, gave way to a situation in which one of the partners, for 
whatever reason, could unilaterally end the marriage.  This shift assumed 
a new view of marriage, which involved a shift from regarding it as a 
truly fundamental social institution to regarding it primarily as a personal 
union, in which there was a very limited social interest—virtually as a  
private contract terminable at the will of either party.68
This shift occurred in conjunction with other changes, most notably 
the widespread availability of contraception, which made possible a 
radical change in social attitudes toward sexuality.69  Traditionally, sexual 
intercourse always carried with it the possibility of conceiving a child, 
and social norms generally dictated that a man marry the woman with 
whom he had conceived a child.  With contraception, sex could be, and 
was, separated from marriage as an autonomous activity independent of 
childbearing, engaged in for pleasure and personal intimacy, and often 
engaged in without regard to marriage (present or potential).  Elite 
intellectuals and those who took their ideology as a reference point 
 68. On the magnitude of present current efforts to change the meaning of marriage, 
see Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Thoughts on the History of the Family, in THE FAMILY, 
CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE STATE 3 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 1998). 
 69. See Robert P. George, Natural Law, The Constitution, and the Theory and 
Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2272–73 (2001) (explaining the 
relationship between the increasing availability of contraception and sexual liberation). 
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(including especially the media elite) generally welcomed these changes 
as opportunities for sexual liberation.70  These attitudes spread swiftly in 
society, and were manifested in earlier ages of first sexual experience 
(especially for women), more sexual partners, and widespread cohabitation, 
as well as lower birth rates.71  For reasons that were not entirely accidental, 
they were also accompanied by growth in pornography and abortion.72
With these developments, homosexuality emerged as a new theme of 
sexual liberation.  If heterosexuals could engage in sexual activity for 
pleasure and personal intimacy, apart from children and marriage, why 
not homosexuals as well?  This sort of logic was implicit in judicial 
opinions such as the Bowers v. Hardwick dissents.  In his dissent, 
Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority’s treatment of the case as 
one of homosexual sodomy did not square with the actual law—a law 
that prohibited sodomy (oral or anal sex) whether it was heterosexual or 
homosexual.73  The assumption behind this observation seemed to be 
that, since the statute would probably not survive a challenge by 
heterosexuals—certainly married ones, and probably unmarried ones—its 
application to homosexuals was dubious as well.74
 70. On the ideology of “expressive individualism” among media elites, see Robert 
Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Family Values and Media Reality, in THE FAMILY, CIVIL 
SOCIETY, AND THE STATE 173 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 1998).  On elite values more 
generally, see ROBERT LERNER, ALTHEA K. NAGAI & STANLEY ROTHMAN, AMERICAN 
ELITES (Yale Univ. Press 1996).  Of course, many married couples welcomed 
contraception too, but they were less likely to connect it with a broader form of sexual 
liberation.) 
 71. On first age and number of partners, see EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 322–26, 327–28 
(1994); on cohabitation, see LYNNE M. CASPER ET AL., HOW DOES POSSLQ MEASURE UP? 
HISTORICAL ESTIMATES OF COHABITATION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (1999), available at http://www. 
census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0036/twps0036.html. (“Our Adjusted 
POSSLQ estimates indicate that the number of cohabiting households increased from 1.1 
million in 1977 to 4.9 million 20 years later in 1997.  Cohabiting households made up 
1.5 percent of all households in 1977, increasing to 4.8 percent by 1997.”). 
 72. See Gerard V. Bradley, The End of Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND THE COMMON 
GOOD 99, 99–103, 100 (Kenneth Whitehead ed., 2001). 
 73. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 74. Id. at 220. “The Court orders the dismissal of respondent’s complaint even 
though the State’s statute prohibits all sodomy; even though that prohibition is 
concededly unconstitutional with respect to heterosexuals; and even though the State’s 
post hoc explanations for selective application are belied by the State’s own actions.”  
The vulnerability of the prohibition for unmarried heterosexuals, as well as homosexuals, 
appears in Stevens’ observation, id. at 216, that previous cases have determined that “the 
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” 




Public opinion has generally moved in the direction of supporting the 
elimination of legal prohibitions on homosexual activity per se, but that 
movement has stopped short of legitimizing same-sex marriage.  
Americans continue to regard monogamous heterosexual marriage as the 
normative ideal, and they are unwilling to extend the mantle of marriage 
to homosexual relationships.  The question is whether that attachment to 
monogamous heterosexual marriage is simply the retention of an ancient 
prejudice, or a position grounded in some reasonable principles. 
B.  Grounds for Traditional Marriage
The case for traditional marriage is grounded in a conviction that 
marriage is not simply a man-made or socially-devised and revisable 
institution that can be adapted or accommodated at will to changing 
social circumstances.  While it is true there are many ancillary features 
of marriage that are quite variable (for example, the multifarious forms 
of property arrangements associated with marriage at different times and 
places), there is a true core of marriage that exists by nature, and is 
unrevisable.  Marriage is fundamentally a pre-political institution, rooted 
in a natural union of a man and a woman that is ordered to family life 
and childbearing and childrearing.  The political community has very 
important interests affected by this institution—it is a deeply integral 
element of the common good—and therefore has a legitimate right and 
duty to regulate it in certain ways.  However, the political community 
should always act with respect for marriage’s essential features.  The 
most fundamental duty of the political community regarding marriage is 
to help ensure the availability of marriage as a stable institution 
promoting the well-being of couples and children, by providing a 
supportive social ecology. 
The fact that marriage is natural is in no way contradicted by the fact 
that it is also fragile, and in need of social support.75  It is natural that 
human children grow up, become adults, and develop the capacities 
associated with fully developed human beings; that is, this pattern is an 
unfolding of inherent capacities that properly allow human beings to 
grow and flourish.  Yet, this whole process very much requires various 
forms of social support, the absence of which will lead to a frustration of 
their proper development and flourishing.  While human beings are 
naturally ordered to certain ends—that is, certain ends are “natural” in 
the sense that they constitute the full development and flourishing of a 
human being—they are also subject to tendencies that are somewhat at 
 75. As Professor Dripps suggests in the first part of his response.  See Dripps, 
supra note 28, Part I.  
WOLFE.DOC 10/5/2005  10:30 AM 
[VOL. 42:  895, 2005] Why the Federal Amendment is Necessary 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 917 
 
war with their natural ends.  For example, one natural end of a person is 
to cultivate a body that is healthy, yet human beings are also subject to 
desires that cause them to eat too much, in ways that harm their health. 
What are the core natural elements of marriage that a political 
community ought to respect and promote?  Marriage is the permanent 
union of one man and one woman, the mutually intertwined ends of 
which are the good of the spouses and the bearing and raising of 
children.  The political community has a particularly intense interest in 
children, because they are an essential prerequisite for its preservation 
and perpetuation.  Children benefit most from having a biological 
mother and father married to each other and raising their children 
together, and therefore, society has strong reasons to promote marriage 
as a way of ensuring the best interests of children.76  Moreover, insofar 
as marriage is an ordinary means to the happiness of people, and both 
depends on social support and is part of the common good, the political 
community also has an interest in marriage being available for people.77  
Nor are these two interests, children and mutual love, separate and 
independent—they are, rather, deeply intertwined.  The commitment of 
the spouses to love each other—their exclusive, permanent reciprocal 
self-giving—contributes powerfully to their education of their children, 
and the joint project of raising their children contributes powerfully to 
deepening ties between the parents. 
People generally take it for granted that marriage will be available, 
but, despite the powerful forces inclining people to marry, the 
availability of marriage as an institution they can choose to enter cannot 
be taken for granted.  There are powerful forces inclining human beings 
to accumulate property, and there is a strong natural basis for properly 
qualified property rights.  However, in a given society such property 
rights may not be available.  Property is both natural and pre-political,78 
on one hand, and also a social institution essentially dependent on 
various legal arrangements, on the other.  Likewise, marriage is natural 
 76. See, e.g., SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE 
PARENT (1994). 
 77. On the benefits of marriage to the married partners, see LINDA J. WAITE & 
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE (2000). 
 78. In Aristotle’s Politics, the rudiments of economics are identified with 
“household management”; that is, the efforts to provide the resources necessary for life 
(property) begin with the most basic (and pre-political) community, the household.  
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 8–38 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946). 




and pre-political, but also a social institution dependent on various legal 
arrangements. 
One of the ways in which marriage can become unavailable to people 
is for the political community to offer people an institution called “marriage” 
that is not really marriage.  By inculcating in its citizens—through social 
practices and laws—a notion of marriage that lacks some of its essential 
ingredients, a political society could, effectively, make “real marriage” 
impossible for most of its citizens. 
One way to do this is to make marriage a contract that is temporary 
and terminable at the will of either party.  Whatever the impact of the 
allowance of divorce in a certain limited number of cases has been, the 
shift to no-fault divorce has profoundly changed the very notion of 
marriage among Americans, and has deeply damaged it. 
How does this change in law affect marriages?79  In 1970, how easily 
people could say, “if I want to get divorced, that’s my business—I’m not 
making anyone else (except my former spouse) do it.  If others want to 
stay married, let them.”  The problem is that such an attitude ignores the 
subtle interplay of personal choice and social mores.  So many of our 
conceptions are shaped by our sense of what is normal, by the social 
ecology of which we are a part.  No-fault divorce has created a world in 
which divorce is normal, and it is now a part of the ordinary psychological 
landscape of many people.80  For them, marriage is a permanently tentative 
and revisable commitment.  Therefore, not surprisingly, more marriages 
break up, and more of the children they produce grow up without a 
father and mother working together to carry out the profoundly exalting, 
and often terribly difficult, task of childrearing.  Furthermore, people 
 79. No-fault divorce is a good example, I think, of the kind of causal process about 
which Professor Dripps asks.  See Dripps, supra note 28, at 937–38: 
  Thus far I have treated the causal connection between gay marriage and 
marriage-as-institution as one unmediated by personal decisions of the sort 
that break the normatively relevant chain of causes.  There comes a point, 
however, when but-for causes lose their normative relevance . . . .  If all such 
changes do is increase or decrease the range of options people considering 
marriage or divorce have to choose from, can those who change the menu be 
held accountable for what others choose from that menu? 
  Suppose Professor Wolfe is asked to speak about the state of marriage as 
an institution in Denmark or some other jurisdiction where gay marriage has 
been sanctioned by positive law.  What should he say?  “Well, good people, 
time to give up.  Copulate like bonobos, and devil take the children!  Nothing 
any of you might do, or fail to do, can save marriage as an institution.”  I find 
this implausible, and so illuminating.  Gay people are not responsible for the 
choices straight people make about their relationships. 
 80. See Francis George, Law and Culture in the United States, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 
131, 142 (2003) (“Misguided law and policy, starting with no-fault divorce, have 
obscured for Americans the nature and intrinsic goodness of marriage and have taught 
Americans to treat this institution as a mere instrument for the achievement of subjective 
interests.”). 
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grow up believing that couples are unlikely to “remain in happy, 
monogamous marriages for thirty, forty, or fifty years after their last 
child reaches the age of majority.”81  Nor will they be as likely to 
consider what kind of parents men and women will be if they more or 
less expect to dispense with their first partners after the children are 
grown.  Marriage as an institution may continue to evolve pragmatically, 
it is true, but it should give us pause that part of that evolution is helping 
children cope with the pain inflicted on them, in many cases, by their 
parents’ pursuit of their own self-fulfillment. 
Another way to make real marriage unavailable to people—by 
changing social understandings of its very nature—is to make marriage 
essentially separable from children. This is what happens when 
homosexual “marriage” is legitimized despite the fact that homosexual 
unions are essentially—of their very nature—incapable of procreation.  
(There are, of course, many instances in which a heterosexual union is 
incapable of leading to procreation in practice, by reason of age or 
physical defect; but the nature of the union remains the kind of union 
capable of producing children.) 
Homosexual marriage is one more indication from society that 
marriage is whatever we want it to be: a malleable human institution that 
we can shape, rather than a natural institution, with its own internal 
dynamics and demands, to which we must submit.82  As Professor 
Dripps suggests, in his response to this article: If we live longer, we can 
decide to abandon our spouses when they cease to be meaningful 
partners for us.83  Living longer and experiencing more opportunities 
means being able to find a new partner that will be better for us than the 
last one.  Moreover, we can decide to marry a person of our own sex.  Or 
 81. Dripps, supra note 28, at 939. 
 82. The fact that the legitimization of gay marriage would deeply influence our 
social understanding of marriage is the reason it will affect marriage in a way that is 
essentially different from the interplay of homosexuality and other institutions cited by 
Professor Dripps (homosexuality and the military, churches, spectator sports, politics 
[voting], property, and jury service).  Id. at 937.  
 83. Id. at 939.  As Dripps states: 
People will continue to enjoy longer, healthier, and richer lives.  As they do 
so they are likely to see both stronger reasons to divorce and weaker reasons 
to remain married.  No one, outside al Qaeda, is seriously against the 
demographic dynamics.  I find it as difficult to believe that marriage as an 
institution is headed for the scrap-heap of anthropology, as I find it difficult to 
believe that people will remain in happy, monogamous marriages for thirty, 
forty, or fifty years after their last child reaches the age of majority. 
Id. 




several people.  Or one person for a period of ten, or five or three years.  
However, if we go down the road of making marriage such a malleable 
institution, why should we be surprised if it does not fulfill the functions 
it is designed to fulfill?84
There are many more heterosexuals than homosexuals.  As a result, I 
very much agree with those who point out that the most profound 
damage to marriage as an institution has been wrought by heterosexuals, 
not homosexuals.85  Gay marriage is far from the most harmful aspect of 
contemporary marriage trends.  Heterosexuals, without the help of 
homosexuals, have done an extraordinary job of weakening the family, 
through the adoption of no-fault divorce  (which did not so much reflect 
a social consensus as legitimize and make socially dominant, elite 
views),86 and the growth of widespread promiscuity and cohabitation.87
Professor Dripps, in his response, says that marriage has survived 
many social events, including the sexual revolution, and it will survive 
gay marriage too.88  To the contrary, I do not think marriage survived the 
sexual revolution.  Every war has winners and losers, and, as some have 
argued, the boys won the sexual revolution (because it legitimized 
 84. My argument is not, it should be clear, an argument that homosexuals are 
per se hostile to the general concept of marriage.  Some homosexuals want to marry 
to express deep and enduring love for one another.  At the same time it remains 
unclear how many homosexuals really want marriage for itself, and not as a simple 
way of furthering social legitimization of homosexuality.  Moreover, it seems 
plausible that most homosexuals want marriage only under certain conditions, which 
include non-permanence and even sexual non-exclusivity; that is, as one person has 
said, homosexuals “want what marriage has now become,” not what it once was 
thought to be.  Bryce Christensen, Why Homosexuals Want What Marriage Has Now 
Become, in THE FAMILY IN AMERICA , Apr. 2004. 
 85. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 28, at 939:  
The urgency of the Paul Revere style warnings about gay marriage stands in 
surreal contrast to the majority culture’s smug complacency about such 
genuine threats to durable and happy marriages as adultery, substance abuse, 
compulsive gambling and domestic violence.  Those are evils undermining 
millions of marriages, evils that get a political pass because they happen to be 
practiced by the general, mostly heterosexual, population. 
 86. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION 85 (1988). 
 87. For the record, I would be happy to help resolve, to the extent I can, Professor 
Dripps’ unhappiness about “the majority culture’s smug complacency about such 
genuine threats to durable and happy marriages as adultery, substance abuse, compulsive 
gambling and domestic violence.” Dripps, supra note 28, at 939.  I am not entirely sure 
that these phenomena get the simple political pass that Professor Dripps thinks they do, 
see id. at 939, but I agree much more needs to be done.  We could work on domestic 
violence, for example, by reducing cohabitation by both different-sex and same-sex 
partners, which is more highly correlated with domestic violence than marriage.  See, 
e.g., Gregory L. Greenwood et al., Battering Victimization Among a Probability-Based 
Sample of Men Who Have Sex with Men, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1964, 1967 (2002); 
Kersti Yllo & Murray A. Straus, Interpersonal Violence Among Married and Cohabiting 
Couples, 30 FAM. REL. 339, 339–47 (1981). 
 88. Dripps, supra note 28, at 938.   
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recreational sex and even induced many women to adopt such male 
attitudes, especially among elites).  The most prominent victims were the 
children who have been deprived of the enduring husband-and-wife 
family that should ordinarily be their birthright.89
If it is true that heterosexuals have already deeply damaged marriage 
as a social institution, that still leaves the question of whether these 
wounds already inflicted on marriage justify the further infliction of 
additional wounds, in the form of legitimizing homosexual marriage, 
with its much more radical separation of marriage and children.90  The 
more sensible path would be to resist further erosion of the institution, 
and to undertake substantial efforts to reconstitute marriage as a stable 
institution in our society.91  The battle over the FMA is a key moment to 
make the public argument for, and shape a public consensus on, the 
necessity of restoring marital stability.  That goal will not be achieved if 
marriage is considered to be a malleable institution, revisable by society, 
and unfettered by deep natural requirements such as monogamy and 
gender differentiation—a view that is at the heart of the movement for 
same-sex marriage. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The obstacles to the Federal Marriage Amendment are, of course, 
overwhelming, as they are for any constitutional amendment.  However, 
this is a battle that needs to be fought.  It is necessary in order to place in 
the Constitution a principle that will resist judicial dominion over social 
issues.  It is necessary in order to place in the Constitution a principle 
that will resist the movement (largely, but not exclusively pursued 
through the courts) toward sexual autonomy.  It is necessary in spite of 
the fact that it calls for a modification—in light of great changes in the 
country—of federalism, precisely in order to protect the Founders’ 
broader constitutional design.  Finally, it is necessary because there are 
reasonable grounds to protect, promote, and make available to people a 
 89. See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead’s insightful, and bleak, analysis of current 
mating mores in How We Mate, CITY J., Summer 1999, at 38, available at http://www. 
city-journal.org/html/9_3_how_we_mate.html. 
 90. For a succinct survey of grounds for opposing same-sex marriage, with 
citations to social science sources, see Witherspoon Institute, Arguments Against Same 
Sex Marriage (SSM), http://www.winst.org/toptenlists.htm (last visited June 10, 2005). 
 91. See Inst. for Am. Values, What’s Next for the Marriage Movement, at 
http://www.marriagemovement.org/wnxt/what_next.php (Dec. 16, 2004). 




genuine institution of marriage—monogamous and heterosexual—both 
for the social interests it advances and the personal happiness it makes 
possible. 
A Postscript 
I think it is necessary to respond to the last point that Professor Dripps 
makes in response to this article, namely, that I have “nothing to say 
about what might be good for gay people, about how some regard for 
our welfare and happiness should influence public policy.”92  He 
concludes from this that “[o]ur emotional lives our material interests, 
and our political dignity merit no discussion.  We are, for all he has to 
say about us, mere means to the end of preserving marriage for the 
benefit of others.”93
I did not discuss this topic—the well-being of homosexuals—in this 
article because I was dealing with a more limited topic (the FMA).  I 
have had something to say about this issue elsewhere.94  I strongly affirm 
that it is an important principle of political morality that those with 
charge of the common good be concerned about the well-being of every 
single member of the community. 
One way to respond to Professor Dripps’ charge would be a 
minimalist approach.  That is, one might respond that the FMA would 
pretty much leave homosexuals alone, permitting them to live the lives 
they want to live, but denying them something they have no “right” to: 
the moral approval of other people and the legitimization of their 
relationships by society.95  Society denies marriage to homosexuals in 
the same way that it denies marriage to those who wish multiple spouses 
or marriage with one of their parents—not because it entertains any 
animus against such people themselves, but because it reasonably adopts 
a view of marriage different from the one they have. 
A fuller response to the charge would go much further.  It would be 
similar in many ways to the proper response to those who suffer from 
alcoholism or addiction.  According to this view, the best thing for gay 
people—that is, for those afflicted with same-sex attractions—is not to 
act on those inclinations.  Regard for the welfare and happiness of 
 92. Dripps, supra note 28, at 947–48.   
 93. Dripps, supra note 28, at 948.   
 94. See, e.g., Christopher Wolfe, Homosexuality in American Public Life, in SAME-SEX 
MATTERS 3 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 2000); Christopher Wolfe, Being Worthy of Trust: A 
Response to Joseph Raz, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 131 (Robert P. 
George ed., 1996). 
 95. Indeed, it is not clear why, on the emerging view of marriage, society should 
legitimize anyone’s relationships, as some scholars have argued.  On their view, 
marriage as a public legal form should just be abolished and left to private arrangements. 
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homosexuals in public policy would best be expressed by the refusal 
of society to be collective “enablers,” encouraging people to follow 
inclinations that are harmful socially and morally, and often emotionally 
and physically as well.96  Public policy should show its deep concern for 
homosexuals by helping them to see the disorder in their sexual 
attractions, and by adopting policies that would, as much as possible, 
prevent the formation of same-sex attractions and offer possibilities for 
changing them, where possible.97
The latter, and fuller, response is, unfortunately, likely to be rejected 
by many people in our society today.  I do think it is important for some 
people to make such a response publicly, however, in order to reinforce 
the moral grounds of the surprisingly durable opposition to homosexual 
marriage.  This durable opposition to homosexual marriage is surprising 
considering the crusading commitment of intellectual elites and the 
tireless propagandizing of those who disseminate their views, such as the 
media, and often judges. 
To avoid one sort of possible misunderstanding—the false idea that I 
might want to return to some alleged golden age in the past—I would 
add that the movement away from certain typical responses to 
homosexuals in the past, including loathing and contempt (an attitude 
that is, thankfully, no longer publicly tolerated) is a great advance.  
Indeed, today, it is probably more common and socially acceptable—and 
certainly in academic settings and among media elites—for gay rights 
advocates to paint their opponents (those who consider homosexuality 
immoral and socially harmful) as irrational and hateful bigots. 
At any rate, the accusation that those who are opposed to legitimizing 
homosexual activity and relationships do so out of disdain for 
 96. The evidence of physical harms resulting from male homosexual activity 
(especially anal intercourse) is powerful.  See JEFFREY SATINOVER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE 
POLITICS OF TRUTH 49–70 (1996).  The emotional harm is suggested by the higher levels of 
domestic abuse among homosexual couples, as well as by an analysis of the psychological 
wounds that often underlie homosexual inclinations. On the former, see supra note 87; on the 
latter, see Richard Fitzgibbons, The Origins and Therapy of Same-Sex Attraction Disorder, in 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 85 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 1999). 
 97. There is considerable controversy about the possibility of change, but this is 
largely a function of people not wanting to hear the truth.  It is important to note, 
however, that advocates of change have to avoid any suggestion that change is an easy 
matter, which it is clearly not. On the possibility of change, see the websites of The 
National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality, http://www. narth.org 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005) and Positive Alternatives to Homosexuality, http://www. 
pathinfo.org (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 




homosexuals and their welfare—out of “meanness”–—is unjustifiable.  I 
am under no illusion that the rancor of many gay rights advocates toward 
their opponents—which so often results in simple name-calling—will be 
assuaged by this defense. 98  One would expect that those who have come to 
believe that their personal identity is defined by their same-sex attractions 
would react strongly, and even bitterly, to their opponents.  Moreover, if 
homosexual inclinations generally rest on certain psychological wounds, that 
would reinforce such expectations.99  Nonetheless, even if those opposed 
to legitimizing homosexuality cannot expect to assuage the anger of gay 
rights advocates, it is important for them to make it clear that their case 
against legitimizing homosexual activity and relationships is based, not 
on hostility to homosexuals, but on an equal concern and respect for 
them. 
 
 98. I want to emphasize that the conversation at the conference on which the 
volume is based—conducted on all sides with admirable civility—was an honorable 
exception. 
 99. See GERARD J.M. VAN DEN AARDWEG, THE BATTLE FOR NORMALITY (1996). 
